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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
PHI KAPPA IOTA FRATERNITY, 
a non-profit corporation, and DR. 
FLOYD F. HATCH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal cor-
poration, EARL J. GLADE, FRED 
TEDESCO, JOHN B. MATHE-
SON, L. C. ROMNEY, City Com-
missioners; CLEVE WOOLEY and 
W. Y. TIPTON, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Case No. 7357 
All ·page references used .are those of the record. 
The parties are referred to as in the court below. All 
italics are ours, unless otherwise indicated. 
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This is an action by the plaintiff for a declaratory 
judgment brought under the permissive authority of 
Title 104, Chapter 64, Utah Code Annotated 1943. It 
challenges the validity of a certain Salt Lake City or-
dinance which restricts the location of fraternity and 
sorority houses in residential ''A'' districts. In their 
complaint the plaintiffs seek to have the court declare 
the ordinance to be discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious 
and unconstitutional; and the plaintiffs seek injunctive 
relief to prevent the enforcement of the ordinance 
against the plaintiffs. 
In the complaint it is alleged that the plaintiff, 
Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity, is a non-profit corporation, 
affiliated with the University of Utah; that it owns and 
occupies a fraternity hou.se as an ordinary appurten-
ance to the University of Utah; that the plaintiff Floyd 
F. Hatch, is an owner of real property used for resi-
dential purposes by him and his family, which· property 
is located within 600 feet of the University of Utah 
main campus and is designated as 1363 Butler Avenue, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
The complaint further alleges that, pursuant to 
its corporate purposes, the plaintiff fraternity on the 
27th day of August, 1948, purchased a residential unit 
which they occupy -as a fraternity house, designated by 
the street address of 1175 2nd Avenue; that said fra-
ternity house is located within residential ''A'' district 
as defined under Section 6715, Chapter 65, Revised Ord-
inances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944. The complaint 
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alleges that the plain tiff fraternity has expended large 
sums of money in purchasing and furnishing s.aid hous-
ing unit. The complaint further alleges that the de-
fendants haYe ordered the plaintiff fraternity to vacate 
the property, to cease using said property as a fra-
ternity house, and have threatened to issue criminal 
complaints in the event the order is not obeyed; that 
the defendants in the past have enforced said ordinance 
according to their interpretation of its terms and have 
compelled fraternities and sororities appurtenant to the 
the University of Utah to locate their establishments 
within 600 feet of the University of Utah campus; that 
to the east of the University of Utah campus are moun-
tains upon which there are no utilities for sewage water; 
electrical power or otherwise and that said land is to-
tally unsuited to housing projects, that to the south of 
the main University of Utah campus is a cemetery which 
is not suitable for the occupancy of living persons, that 
to the west of the University of Utah campus there is 
not available any property within 600 feet suitable for 
occupancy by fraternities and sororities; that as a result 
of such situation a large number of fraternities and 
sororities have been crowded into an area immediately 
north of the University of Utah campus, and as a result 
of such crowding and congestion the public safety, con-
venience., and health have been greatly endangered; that 
as a further result thereof the plaintiff Dr. Floyd F. 
Hatch and other ·p·roperty owners within the area 600 
feet north from the University .of Utah campus have 
suffered a diminution of value to their property, that 
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the use and enjoyment thereof have been lessened be-
cause of the crowded streets and the noise .and disturb-
ance resulting from the overcrowded conditions. That 
the property of plaintiff, Dr. Floyd F. Hatch and of 
the other property owners in the vicinity to the north 
of the University of Utah campus is all located in resi-
dential ''A'' district under th~ aforesaid zoning ordin-
ance. 
The complaint further alleges that said zoning ordi-
nance is .arbitrary, discriminatory and capricious and 
is not proper exercise of any of the police powers of 
Salt Lake City, but on the contrary said ordinance re-
sults in unsafe streets, inadequate housing conditions, 
and parking facilities, congestion of p~eople and noise, 
all of which disturb the peace and quiet of DT. Floyd 
F. Hatch and other property owners residing within 
residential "A" district and within 600 feet of the Uni-
versity of Utah campus; that the said ordinance is ar-
bitrary, discriminatory and capricious in the following 
particulars : 
A. That there is no reasonable basis for permit-
ting fraternity organizations to maintain fraternity 
houses in residential ''A'' district and at same time 
limiting them to locations within 600 feet of the land 
and premises occupied by the University of Utah to 
which they are incident, that the enforcement of such 
a restriction is prejudicial to and discriminatory against 
the plaintiff Floyd F. H:atch and to the other ·p.roperty 
owners in residential ''A'' district who own and oc-
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cupy property 'Yithin 600 feet of the University of 
Utah campus. 
B. That said ordinance expressly permits the con-
struction of schools in all residential ''A'' districts 
and also specifically permits any use ordinarily appur-
tenant to the uses of the property for school purposes 
including the establishment of dormitories, fraternities, 
sororities and boarding houses occupied by ·students and 
faculty members of the schools; that said ordinance 
puts no restriction on the location of fraternity and 
sorority houses incident to or appurtenant to private 
schools and that under the terms of said z.oning ordi-
nance, fraternities appurtenant to private schools may 
build their fraternity homes at any location within the 
residential ''A'' district; that said ordinance then pro-
hibits the maintenance of fraternity houses incident to 
public schools in all residential ''A'' districts except 
within 600 feet of the lands and premises occupied by 
the institution to which they are incident. That there 
is no reasonable basis for such distinction between fra-
ternity houses of public and fraternity houses of priv·ate 
schools, and the same is discriminatory, arbitrary, and 
capricious, as to the ~plaintiff fraternity. 
C. That there is no reasonable basis to justify 
the selection of the distance of 600 feet as the area within 
which fraternity houses must be confined. That said 
distance or limitation is made by said ordinance without 
regard to street or property lines and in effect discrim-
inates against fraternities and sororities incident to the 
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University of Utah only and was designed to confine 
fraternities and sororities of the University of Utah 
to the locations existing when said ordinance was en-
acted, without regard to future growth and development 
of the school. 
D. That the ordinance permits one and two family 
dwellings in residential ''A'' district, and there is no 
limit to the number of persons who may reside on prem-
ises described .as two family dwellings within a residen-
tial ''A'' district, even though said persons are boarders, 
lodgers ·Or renters and there is no limitation of the num-
ber of persons who may reside on premises described 
as one family dwellings in residential ''A'' district, 
except that no more than six persons may reside therein 
as lodgers or boarders paying rent. That it is dis-
criminatory, and arbitrary to prohibit the use of one 
and two family dwellings for residential purposes by 
members of a fraternity appurtenant to a public school. 
E. That there is no reasonable basis for :placing 
fraternities in a restricted classification insof:ar as the 
maintenance of a fraternity house is concerned. 
The complaint further alleges that since the ordi-
nances restricting fraternities to 600 feet from the 
premises occupied by the University of Utah was passed, 
that the University of Utah has more than doubled in 
size and enrollment. That recently the University of 
Utah acquired approximately 300 acres of land which 
was formerly part of Fort Douglas Military Reserva-
tion and that there-after Salt L·ake City enacted a new 
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ordinance by the terms of which all property within six 
hundred feet of said newly acquired property was placed 
in the residential district "AA". That the effect of 
this later ordinance has been to further restrict and 
concentrate the development of fraternities in the area 
immediately surrounding the property of the ·plaintiff 
Hatch. 
In their answer, the defendants allege that the ordi-
nances complained of are within the powers granted to 
Salt Lake City by law to enact an·d that the advisability 
and wisdom of such ordinances are not within the prov-
ince of the court to review, such matter being solely 
within the discretion and good judgment of the Board 
of City Commissioners of Salt Lake City. Upon the 
issues thus joined, the case was tried before the Hon-
orable Roald A. Hogenson, sitting without a jury and 
on February 28, 1949 a decree was entered by the trial 
court deciding the issues in favor of the defendants and 
against the plaintiffs, no cause of action,. dismissing 
plaintiffs' complaint, and dissolving the temporary 
injunction. From that decree the plaintiff,s have prose-
cuted this appeal. 
THE FACTS 
In 1937 a grou·p of residents of Salt Lake City, re- . 
siding in the residential ''A'' area involved in this case, 
petitioned the City Commission of Salt Lake City for 
an amendment of Chapter 47, Section 4710 of the Build-
ing Code of Salt Lake City, restricting the location of 
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dormitories :and fraternity or sorority houses to an 
area within one-eighth of a mile distance from the lands 
and premises occupied by the institution to which they 
were incident. This petition was referred to the City 
Planning and Zoning commission and by them returned 
to the Commission on December 16, 1938, with the rec-
ommendation that the petition be granted, the distance 
being modified from one-eighth of a mile to 600 feet 
(.Exhibit A). A hearing was held u·pon the petition and 
the Commission ordered the Zoning ordinances changed 
(Exhibit B), and thereupon S·ection 6715, Chapter ~5, 
Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, 1944 was adopted. 
That ordinance, so far as material here, reads as fol-
lows: 
''Section 6715. Residential 'A' district. 
(a) In residential 'A' district no building or 
premises shall be us-ed or maintained, and no 
building shall be erected or altered so as to be 
arranged, intended or designed to be used for 
other than one of the following uses: 
1. One-family dwellings. 
2. Two-family dwellings. 
3. Schools. 
* * * 
(b) In a Residential 'A' district buildings and 
· uses, such as are ordinarily appurtenant to any 
of the uses listed above, but not involving the 
conduct. o~ b~siness, s~all be. permitted, subject 
to the hnntat1ons herem provided. 
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1. Accessory uses customarily incident to the 
above uses. 
* * * * 
5. In a one-family d'velling the renting of 
rooms to not more than six (6) persons for lodg-
ing purposes only, or the furnishing of table 
board to not more than six (6) persons, or the 
furnishing a combination of the ·abov-e to not 
more than six (6) persons; provided} however, 
that these provisions shall not be applicable to 
a two-fa-mily dwelling. 
6. Dormitories, frat·ernity or sorority houses 
or boarding houses occupied only by the faculty 
or students of a public ed!uc.ationa·l ins.titution 
and supervised by the authorities thereof, sUJb-
ject, however, to the eaApress condition that such 
houses shall· not be locat·ed or establishe.d more 
than 600 feet distant from the lands and prem-
ises occupied by the institution to which they 
are incident. 
The 600-feet restriction had no application, except 
with reference to the· University of Utah (R. 106-105). 
That restriction was chosen because the petition first 
requested one-eighth (Ys) of a mile and that distance 
embraced all existing fraternity and sorority houses, 
except the one at 51 Wolcott Street and the one ·at 1371 
East South Temple (R. 110). The fact that a "bunch" 
of people by petition stated they didn't want fraterni-
ties in their district :and indicated they wanted the dis-
tance 600 feet is primarily the reason the distance was 
so fixed (R. 113). The amendment was directed to the 
vicinity contiguous to the University and it was in that 
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particular district alone that they were concerned. When 
the 600-foot. restriction was adopted, no p·lace other than 
the University area w:as studied at the time. (R. 114 -
Exhibit C). Indeed, there are no schools in Salt Lake 
City other than the University of Utah that have fra-
ternities or sororities (R. 55). 
The City Planning Engine-er testified that the zon-
ing work of Salt Lake City had been under his charge 
ever since it was established except for 1927. He stated 
that the portion of the A district that is within the 
600-foot limit is equally w·ell suited for fine residential 
homes as the area outside of that limit (R. 93). The 
only reason for holding the 600-foot restriction was to 
keep the students close to the campus and to cut down 
the added traffic congestion incident to fraternity and 
sorority houses (R. 94). The additional traffic con-
gestion caused by fraternity houses w.as one of the 
strong reasons to segregate fraternity and sorority 
houses, and where they are segregated, like the one at 
51 North Wolcott, there is ample parking space and 
there is no particular parking problem (R. 101-102). 
Out of the eighteen fraternities that have homes, there 
is only one aside from the plaintiff that isn't congested 
within the '600 foot area. There are sixteen fraternities 
within the 600-foot zone north of the campus (R. 100). 
In the 600-foot area the streets are more than full with 
traffic and parking (R. 101). The zoning expert ad-
mitted that it would be a disadvantage to the p·roperty 
owners on Butler Avenu·e (where Plaintiff Hatch re .. 
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sides) to have the five ne"~ groups that are looking for 
homes, locate within the 600-foot zone, which is very 
congested right now, and yet it is equally well suited to 
residential purposes as the AA district (R. 104). The 
more congested and numerous fraternities are around 
a giYen house, the more onerous it is (R. 131). Two 
sorority houses have been built on Butler Avenue since 
the plaintiff moved there. The congestion and park-
ing along Butler Avenue has increased since 1939. Park-
ing has become solid almost ;all the way down the street, 
particularly on Monday and Friday evenings when 
meetings and parties are held. Even during the time 
when the University is not in session, at night, and at 
times when there are no functions at Kingsbury Hall, 
there is a crowded and congested condition in the eve-
ning (R .. 135). There is a lot of parking, particularly 
at the Alphi Phi and Phi Mu houses on Monday and 
week-ends, -and the organizations on First South -also 
park on Butler Avenue (R. 136). 
The streets on North Wolcott and Second A venue 
are noticeably wider than on Butler Avenue or Federal 
Way, and there being fewer fraternities on Wolcott 
and Second Avenue, it is possible to get parking space 
and there is not so much likelihood of the street· being 
blocked by parking on an angle (R. 139-140). The fra-
ternity and sorority students at the University of Utah 
own 282 cars in addition to which a number of the stu-
dents drive cars from time to time belonging to their 
parents (R. 76). The zoning expert did not think that 
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all fraternities should be crowded into the 600 foot 
strip (R. 103). 
The second reason given why it was desirable to 
confine the fraternities and sororities into the 600 foot 
area was to have them located closer to the campus. 
The effect of the ordinance is to drive fraternities to 
the more distant B zones or to crowd them into the 
already congested area to the north of the campus. 
East of the campus is closed by th·e military reserva-
tion and south of the campus is closed by the cemetery; 
the north of the campus is closed beyond the 600 foot 
strip in the immediate vicinity of Butler Avenue by 
the AA zoning (R. 103, Exhibit 1, Exhibit D). Along 
the west side of the campus there are churches and a 
business section and residences. There is a city water 
pool and a city park on the northwest corner of the 
campus. There are no fraternities or sororities located 
in the area west of 13th East and generally :all the fra-
ternity and sorority houses of the University are located 
in the area beginning on the corner of First South east 
of Wolcott, north about two blocks to the Phi Kappa 
house and west to University Street (R. 58-59). There 
are ·twelve fraternities and seven fraternities that have 
houses in the area of First South and Perry A venue 
(R. 60). Most of the homes between the Emery House 
on Second South and Carleson Hall on Fifth South are 
rather small (R. 109). Other than the 600 :f.oot area to 
the north, fraternities must look to the more distant 
B zones. (See zoning map) 
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It \\-as stipulated that the court may take judicial 
notice -of all the planning ordinances of the City prior 
to and subsequent to 1939 (R. 79). It was also stipu-
lated that the red line on Exhibit D that goes up through 
the center of the map is the present 600-foot line from 
the University campus (R. 79) ~ and the heavy green 
line that comes up the south side of South Temple and 
follows the South Side of Federal Way and then on 
up through the center of the map is the boundary for 
the AA zone. The location of the various fraternities 
and sororities are indicated on this map at th.e houses 
and addresses noted, and it was stipuluated that the 
map correctly shows what it purports to represent 
(R. 80). 
In the interpretation of its ordinances, the city had 
denied to a fraternity the right to move into the Carter 
home which was on a lot that was partially within and 
partly outside of the 600 foot limit (R. 97). 
The witness, Don Ogden, testified that he is pres-
ident of the plaintiff fraternity (R. 71); that he spent 
as much time as he could along with the committee, two 
assistants, to hunt for a suitable house, but that the 
only house available within the 600 feet limit was the 
Adams home and the owner wanted $40,000 cash. for 
that home; that for the entire year, they searched 
through the areas around the campus for a home, in-
cluding the area west of the campus (R. 72); that they 
exhausted every effort within the 600 foot limit and 
within the Butler district looking for a home (R. 73). 
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That on August 27th, 1948, the plaintiff fraternity en-
tered into a contract to purchase the property located 
at 1175 Second Avenue for $35,000, p:ayable $500.00 
down ; $4500 on possession or on or before September 
15th, 1948, and $2000 on or before three months from 
the date of :possession; that all payments have been 
kept up on the contract except the last $2,000 and ar-
rangements were in process in regard to that sum. That 
the plaintiff fraternity entered into possession on or 
about September 12th, 1948 (R. 74). It was not nec-
essary to remodel the home to :adapt it to fraternity 
uses. There are four car garages back of the house and 
a cement patio that will park about 8 cars plus a long 
driveway that would accommodate another 6 or 8 cars, 
in :addition to the front footage of the house. That 25 
students were then residing at the house and the house 
would amply provide housing for 30 or more (R. 75). 
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR 
1. That the court erred in its finding that the 
said ordinance Section 6715 of Chapter 65, of the Re-
vised Ordinances of Salt Lake City, Utah, 1944 is not 
unreasonably discriminatory, arbitrary or capricious in 
any of the particulars alleged by plaintiffs or otherwise, 
but is valid and constitutional, in that such finding is 
not supported by and is against the weight of the evi-
dence. 
2. That the court erred in failing to find th:at as 
a result of the congestion of the fraternities and sorori-
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ties within the 600 foot area immediately north of the 
University of Utah eampus the public safety, conven-
ience and health have been greatly ·endangered. 
3. That the court erred in failing to find that as a 
further result of the congestion of the fraternities and 
sororities within the "600 foot area, the plaintiff Dr. 
Floyd F. Hatch has suffered detriment in the us-e, en-
joyment and value of his property. 
4. That the court erred in its finding Number 7 
and each part thereof in that such finding is not sup-
ported by and is against the weight of the evidence. 
5. That the court erred in failing to find that the 
zoning ordinance is arbitrary, discriminatory and ca-
pricious and is not a proper exercise of any of the 
police powers of Salt Lake City and in failing to find 
that it, results in congested an·d unsafe streets, inade-
quate housing conditions, and congestion of people and 
noise. 
6. That the court erred in failing to find that the 
allegations of Paragraph IX (a) of plaintiff's complaint 
are true. 
7. That the court erred in failing to find that the 
allegations of Paragraph IX (b) of the complaint are 
true. 
8. That the court erred in failing to find that the 
allegations of Paragraph IX (c) of the complaint are 
true. 
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9. That the court erred in failing to find that the 
allegations of Paragraph IX (d) of the complaint are 
true. 
10. That the court .erred in failing to find that the 
allegations of Paragraph IX (e) of the complaint are 
true. 
11. That the court erred in failing to declare the 
ordinance to be discriminatory, arbitrary, capricious 
and unconstitutional. 
12. That the court erred in refusing to p~ermanently 
enjoin the defendants from attempting to enforce 
the ordinance against the !plaintiff fraternity or from 
attempting to enforce the said ordinance so as to com-
pel additional fraternity units to locate within the vicin-
ity of the plaintiff Hatch. 
13. That the court erred in its finding Number 6 
and each part thereof, s:aid finding being unsupported 
by and against the weight of the evidence. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT ONE 
The ordinance is unconstitutional because: 
A. The ordinance unreasonably discriminates be-
tween fraternities affiliated with public schools and 
fraternities affiliated with private schools. 
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B. The ordinance unreasonably discriminates be-
t"~een two family dwellings and fraternity and sorority 
houses and dormitories. 
C. The ordinance unreasonably disc rim in ate s 
against the property of Plaintiff Hatch. 
D. The ordinance is unreasonably discriminatory 
in that it is directed only against the University of Utah 
and fraternities and sororities appurtenant thereto. 
E. The 600-foot restriction is arbitrary, capri-
cious and without any reasonable basis. 
F. There is no constitutional basis for segregating 
from residential users, ·p.ersons who use residential prop'-
erty for fraternity and sorority houses. 
A. THE ORDINANCE UNREASONABLY DJS--
CRIMINATES BETWEEN FR·ATERNITIES AFFIL-
IATED WITH PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND FRATERNI-
TIES AFFILIATED WITH PRIVATE S,CHOOLS. 
A mere reaqing of the ordinance will demonstrate 
that "Schools" may locate anywhere in Residential 
''A'' district. This of course, includes both public 
schools and private schools. 
The ordinance next provides (subsection [b]) that 
"buildings and uses" ordinarily appurtenant to schools 
may he maintained in Residential ''A'' district. It thus 
seems crystal clear that schools, both public and private, 
together with buildings and uses ordinarily appurten-
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ant to schools, public or private, may be located and 
maintained anywhere in Residential ''A'' district. 
Subsection (a) of the ordinance does not, of course, 
deal with any appurtenant uses. Subsection (a) con-
tains the list of ·primary uses. It is then followed with 
subsection (b) which permits appurtenant uses subject 
to the "limitations" contained ther-ein. Then follow 7 
subdivisions, each one of which interprets and limits 
various types of appurtenant uses. Subdivision 1 of 
subsection (b) limits other uses to uses ''customarily 
incident.'' Subdivision 2 limits the business of :a physi-
cian, musician or other professional person to his dwell-
ing". Subdivision 3 limits the size of signs and their 
contents. Subdivision 4 also places limitations on signs, 
their size and location. Subdivision 5 pl.aces limitations 
on the number of lodgers or boarder·s permitted in a 
.''single-family dwelling.'' Subdivision 6 limited dormi-
tories, fraternity and sorority houses of public insti-
tutions, to houses occupied only by faculty or students 
and supervised by the institution. Subdivision 7 limits 
the size of a private garage and its location on the lot. 
In short, the ordinance in question sets up this gen-
eral pattern: Subsection (a) ·expr·essly permits certain 
primary uses in Residential ''A'' district. Subdivision 
(b) permits uses ordinarily appurtenant to one of the 
primary uses set forth in subsection (a). Subsection 
(b) then proceeds to int·erpret, define, and limit various 
appurtenant uses. All uses which are accessory uses and 
are customarily incident to the primary uses are inter-
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preted in the other subdivisions and limitations are im-
posed thereon. Of course, the general language of sub-
section (b) would p·ermit other ''ordinarily appurtenant 
uses'' even though they were not specified in one of the 
seven subdivisions and even though no specific limita-
tions were imposed thereon. 
There is of course, independent of ordinance, an 
absolute right on the part of a property owner to utilize 
it as he sees fit, so long as he does not create a public 
or a private nuis·ance. It is therefore, to a certain ex-
tent, erroneous to look to the ordinance for the grant 
of a right to maintain a fraternity house in residential 
"A" district. Rather, we should look to the terms of 
the ordinance to see what uses are prohibited because 
all uses not prohibited, of course, are ·p·ermitted. No 
matter how the ordinance quoted above, be construed, 
it will result in discrimination b·etween public and pri-
vate schools. By the express terms of the statute schools, 
both public and private, are permitted to locate in resi-
dential ''A''. Whether Section 6 be considered as a 
grant of the right to fraternities to locate in residential 
"A", or as we contend, a limitation on fraternities of 
public schools, it nevertheless is limited only to fraterni-
ties and sororities incident to public institutions. Fra-
ternities and sororities incident to private schools are 
not covered at all by Section 6. It is absolutely impos-
sible to escape this conclusion. The reference in sub-
section (a) to "schools", must be construed to include 
all schools. See 'Western Thea .. Seminary vs. Eva.nston, 
331 Ill. 257, 162 N. E. 863. The reference to fraternity 
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houses and sorority houses incident to ''public educa-
tional institutions'' certainly eliminates those attached 
to private schools, so that there is a distinction made 
between fraternity :and sorority houses incident to public 
schools and those incident to ·private schools. As we 
will demonstrate by the cases to follow, there is no con-
stitutional basis for such a distinction. 
It is common knowledge that dormitories, fraternity 
houses and sorority houses are ''ordinarily appurten-
ant to'' the operation of schools, both public and pri-
vate. The evidence made that clear, but court cases 
involving that point are very difficult to find. 
W·e did find one case which clearly· holds that dor-
mitories are ap.purtenant to, and ordinarily incident to 
the opera ti9n of private schools. See the case of Western 
Theological Seminary vs. City of Evanston, 331 Ill. 257, 
162 N. E. 863. There, an ordinance permitted in resi-
dential "A" district, (1) Single-family houses, (2) 
Churches and Temples, ( 3) Libraries, ( 4) Schoqls and 
Colleges. (5) Farming and Truck gardening. 
The Western Theological Seminary elected to construct 
a dormitory in connection with the school. A dispute 
and a law suit ensued. The city, in opposition to the 
construction of the dormitory, amended its ordinance 
under pTessure from the local citizens, and in the 
amended ordinance provided that only such schools as 
had the power of emine~t domain could locate in resi-
dential ''A'', thus making a distinction between public 
and private schools. This was held unconstitutional in 
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a prior case. See Western Theological S e JJrina ry v. City 
of Evanston, 325 Ill. 511, 156 N. E. 778. The ordin-
ance "1'as then amended to permit public and p·rivate 
schools but as amended it expressly excluded dormitor-
ies. The court in holding that the construction of dor-
mitories "~as ordinarily incident to schools, and that no 
ordinance could constitutionally permit schools to exist 
in residential "A" area, and at the same time prohibit 
the construction of dormitories, said that dormitories 
are ''buildings ordinarily forming a part of the equip-
ment and plant of colleges, and the fact that dormitories 
were proposed to be erected, did not justify the passage 
of the amended ordinance.'' The ordinance which pro-
posed to permit schools, both p1Jblic and p·rivate, to exist 
in residential ''A'' district, but to prohibit the construc-
tion of· dormitories as an incident thereto, was held to 
be unconstitutional. The court thus clearly held that 
the operation of a dormitory was a use ordinarily appur-
tenant or incident to the operation of a college. 
We have been unable to locate any other cases dis-
cussing the question of whether or not dormitories and 
fraternities are ordinarily incident or appurtenant to 
colleges. We have, however, located several cases dis-
cussing the question of ap·p.urtenant uses. The case 
of Kenney vs. Building Commissioner of Melrose, Mass. 
53 N. E. 2d. 683, held that it was a proper "accessory 
use'' to a class ''A'' residence to build and operate a 
small conservatory for the raising of p·lants and flowers 
for the . personal pleasure of the resident. 
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In the case of Village of St. Louis Park vs. Casey, 
Minn., 16 N. W. 2d. 459, the court held that the con-
struction and operation of radio equipment consisting 
of a large pole and wires located outside of the home, 
even where the equipment installed in connection there-
with, exceeded in cost $10,000.00, was an accessory use to 
a class ''A'' dwelling. 
In Provo City vs. Claudin, 91 Utah 60, 63 P. 2d 570, 
the Utah Supreme Court held that it was so obvious that 
a funeral home was not an ordinary accessory or inci-
dental use for a dwelling that the matter did not war-
rant discussion. 
These are the only cases we have been able to find 
which discuss appurtenant uses or ordinary accessory 
or incidental uses in connection with zoning ordinances. 
The word, "appurtenant", as it applies generally, is 
defined in Corpus Juris Secundum, Volume 6 ·page 139. 
There are perhap.s a hundred different definitions given. 
We believe that in line with the Illinois holding, fra-
ternities, sororities, and dormitories ordinarily are ap-
purtenant uses to schools. In fact, the Illinois case went 
so far as to hold that they were so much an appurtenant 
use thereof, that it was unconstitutional to put schools 
in residential "A'', and prohibit the location of dormi-
tories in residential ''A''. 
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PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SCHOOLS 
There are numerous rases holding that it is un-
constitutional to distinguish between public and private 
schools. 
In one of the later cases, Catholic Bishop vs. King-
ery, (Ill.) 20 X. E. 2d, 583, the ordinance, according to 
the court provided : 
''Section 3 and 3a of the ordinance provide 
that no building shall be used or thereafter 
erected or altered with the 'A residential' districts 
unless otherwise provided by the ordinance ex-
cept for the necessary use to which anyone of 
the following places or establishments may be 
put: Single family dwelling, church or temple, 
public school, library ... '' 
In holding this bad the court said : 
''Examination of the ordinance before us re-
veals that it expressly permits a public school 
to be maintained in the 'A Residential' section 
but prohibits the existence of a private or paro-
chial school. The only question before us then 
is this: Does an ordinance which permits the 
maintenance of a public school but excludes the 
operation of a private school within the same 
area bear any substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals or welfare~ 
"The Catholic Bishop ·Of Chicago proposes to 
erect a parochial school and chapel up~on the 
property in question. We fail to perceive . to 
what degree a Catholic school of this type will be 
more detrimental or dangerous to the public 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
24 
health than a public school. It is not pointed out 
to us just how the pupils in attendance at the 
parochial school are any more likely to jeopar-
dize the public safety than the public school pu-
pils. Nor can we arbitrarily conclude that the 
prospective students of the new school will ser-
iously undermine the general welfare.'' 
In City of Miami Beach vs. State, ex rel Lear, 128 
Fla. 750, 175 So. 537, the court held that to prohibit 
private school while permitting public school is arbi-
frary and invalid. Said th·e Court: 
"It will be noted that the ordinance as amend-
ed specifically permits the conducting of public 
schools within the prescribed zone and prohibits 
the conducting of private schools of all sorts 
therein. The prohibiting classification finds no 
foundation or basis in reason or experience that 
has been brought to our attention. 
"What objectionable characteristic touching 
the comfort or other general welfare of the sur-
rounding community may obtain as to a private 
school which would not probably obtain in a 
greater degree as to a public school has not been 
suggested, and, we think for the very good reason 
that none exists. For this reason alone the ordi-
nance as amended, must be held to be arbitrary.'' 
See also Western Theological Seminary vs. Evan-
ston, 331 Ill. 257, 162 N. E. 863 to the same effect. 
See also Alpha Rho Alumni Ass'n vs. City of New 
Brunswick, (N. J.) 18 A. 2d. '68, which held that it was 
unconstitutional to distinguish between College fraterni-
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ties and other fraternal organizations. There the statute 
in question. gayp a tax exemption for property used in 
\York of or for the purpose of fraternal organizations. 
The Act then expressly excluded ''college clubs, col-
lege lodges or college fraternities.'' The court held that 
the attempted distinction \Yas invalid because it was 
without any reasonable basis. 
\\ .... e \Yere lmable to find any authority the other 
\Yay on this point. 
B. THE ORDINANCE UNCONSTITUTION-
ALLY DISCRIJIINATES BETWEEN TWO-FAMILY 
DWELLINGS AND SORORITY AND FRATER:NITY 
HOUSES A?\7D DORMITORIES. 
Our next contention is that the ordinance permits 
unrestricted use of two-family dwellings for the main-
tenance of roomers and boarders. The evidence shows 
that the house at 1175 Second Avenue, ·operated by the 
plaintiff fraternity was a single-family dwelling. Th.at 
it is now being occupied by the plaintiff fraternity, 
without any structural alterations of any kind whatso-
ever; the only difference being, that instead of a single 
blood family residing in said home, the occupants there-
of now are students .at the University of Utah, living 
together with a common housekeeping unit. 
In this connection the ordinance is altogether silent 
in prescribing rules with respect to the occupants of two 
family dwellings. There is nothing to prohibit a large 
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number of people from occupying a two family dwelling 
without regard to the facilities available in such dwell-
ing, sanitary or otherwise, to accommodate the occu-
pants. An ordinance is altogether ineffective to pro-
mote the public welfare, safety, or health, which permits 
an unlimited number of persons to occup;y a two family 
dwelling without regard to its facilities, and yet p;re-
vents a fraternity from occupying a home equipped 
with ample facilities, sanitary and otherwise, to accom-
modate its members who reside there while attending 
the University of Utah. We do not perceive in what 
manner the public safety, welfare, or health is thus 
promoted by the ordinance. 
Section 6713, of the Revised Ordinances of Salt 
Lake City, 1944, defines the word family as follows: 
" 'Family'. Any number of individuals liv-
ing together as a single housekeeping unit, and 
doing their cooking on the premises independent 
of and separated from any other group or 
family." 
Two-family dwelling is described by the same section 
as follows, to-wit: 
'''Two-family' dwelling. A building arranged 
or designed to be occupied. by two-families.'' 
Section 6715, which is the section set out in full 
above, and the section which is under attack here, ex-
pressly p·ermits two-family dwellings in residential "A'' 
district. It also expressly ·permits all uses which are 
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ordinary appurtenant to two-family dwellings. In re-
gard to one-family dwellings, Section 5 provides that 
only 6 persons may be taken for lodging or for board, 
or for both purposes. And then it is expressly provided 
as f ollo"rs : 
''Provided, however, that these provisions 
shall not be applicable to a two-family dwelling.'' 
In line with our general discussion above relating 
to the construction of (b) and the divisions th.ereunder 
as limitations rather than as grants of the right to oc-
cupy premises, there can be little doubt that two-family 
dwellings are without limitation as to the number of 
boarders or lodgers who may live under one roof. Cer-
tainly it is incidental to the occupation of a home as a 
two-family dwelling, that boarders and lodgers be ·per-
mitted to live therein. In fact, the definition of ''family'' 
in Section 6713, makes it clear that boarders and lodgers 
may be included within the f.amily. Reference to the 
definition shows that any number of individuals living 
together as a ''single housekeeping unit'' is a family, 
and in a two-family dwelling, two of such units may 
live in the house. In addition to that, all uses which are 
ordinarily appurtenant, or incidental thereto may also 
be carried on on the premises. In regard to one-family 
dwellings, the statute expressly prohibits the renting 
of rooms or the furnishing of meals or a combination 
of rooms and meals to more than 6 p·ersons. But it goes 
on to say expressly that the limitations will not app~ly 
to two-family dwellings. Therefore, two-family dwell-
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ings may go on unrestricted in the number of renters 
and boarders that may be taken into the home. 
Under the decided cases, this is expressly con-
demned.· The best case on . this is Merrill vs. City of 
Wheaton, (Ill.) 190 N .E. 918. In this case an ordinance 
limited a particular district to single-family dwellings. 
Two-family dwellings were ·p,rohibited. Merrill wanted 
to change a one-family dwelling to a two-family dwelling 
and the city would not let him. The court held the ordi-
nance unconstitutional as unreasonable and discrimina-
tory because it permitted one family dwellings to take 
boarders and thus bring many people under one roof 
but prohibited two family dwellings. It thus held that 
there was no reasonable basis for the distinction. The 
court said: 
"Its application here results in unfair dis-
crimination, without any corresponding benefit 
to the public health, morals, safety or w-elfare. 
Certainly the public health is not promoted by 
an ordinance which restricts the right of one 
property owner to erect or alter a residence to 
house two families separately under one roof, 
and at the same time permits as many as twenty-
eight boarders and roomers to legally make use 
of .another residence in the same block. The 
morals, welfare, and safety of the public are not 
especially subserved by boarding and rooming 
houses as com'pared with two-family residences 
-at least not to the extent of justifying a legis-
lative act which favors one and forbids the 
other.'' 
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C. THE ORDIN.A.~lNCE UNREASONABLY DIS-
CRI1lll~"'.L-1TES AGAINST TH'E PROPERTY OF 
PL.A-11~-rTIFF H.A.1TCH. 
It appeared \Yithout dispute in the evidence that 
the present ordinance \vas, in fact, causing the fraterni-
ties and sororities incident to the University of Utah, 
to congest in the 600 foot area to the north of the Uni-
versity campus. It is in this area that Dr. Hatch resides. 
Within the past nine pears, since the 600 foot limitation 
was imposed, 4 new fraternity and sorority houses have 
located in the 600 foot district. The testimony of Doean 
Ballif demonstrates that there are perhaps seven more 
fraternity groups looking for houses now. The area 
to the east and to the south is closed to the students. 
The area to the north is closed except within the 600 
foot strip. New fraternal groups as they come upon the 
campus have two alternatives: (1) They can locate to 
the west, or (2) They can locate within the 600 foot 
limit. Regardless of what might be available to the 
west, the students are in fact, locating within the 600 
foot strip. The University has more than doubled in 
size since 1939, and fraternal groups on the campus are 
definitely on the increase. The addition of all the fra-
ternal units within this '600 foot strip, without question, 
results in congested parking, and congested living quar-
ters, and of course, greatly restricts the use by Dr. 
Hatch of his property. There is no dispute in the evi-
dence concerning the above facts. 
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Mr. Woolley, who is the chief planner for Salt Lake 
City, and the only expert who testified, gave it as his 
opinion, that there w.as no essential difference in the 
property to the north of the University campus located 
within the 600 foot strip and the prop.erty located with-
out the 600 foot strip over in Federal Heights area. That 
all of the ·property, both that within and that without 
the 600 foot limit, were ·equally well adapted to use as 
selected residential property. Nevertheless, the City 
. has, upon petition by one group of the residents of that 
exclusive area, drawn a line which has forced the fra-
ternity groups right into the laps of all other property 
owners in that '600 foot area. There is nothing in the 
evidence even to suggest a reason why Dr. Hatch should 
have fraternities on ·every side of him, and why the 
other users, immediately adjacent to the 600 foot line 
in Federal Heights, should to no extent be bothered by 
such congestion. In fact, the only testimony on this is 
the testimony of Mr. Woolley who said that there was 
no difference whatever in the character of the two areas 
for home property. That they were built up together 
as a part of the same gener.al development. That each 
was equally well adapted to home ·property, and still 
are equally well adapted. They are contiguous and oc-
cupy the same narrow area of the city. Mr. Woolley 
also admitted that the area has so built up with fraterni-
ty houses now, that it would he detrimental to the health, 
morals and welfare of the people to continue to have 
that area built up with fraternity homes. That more 
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homes added to the traffic congestion and general prob-
lem would only make the matter worse. (R. 103) 
As will be pointed out in more detail hereafter, the 
only justification for zoning ordinances is that they re-
late to and tend to promote the public health, safety 
and welfare. This, they must do without unreasonable 
discrimination. Whenever a wning ordinance in its 
practical ap.plication does not promote the health, safety 
or welfare, or whenever the same is discriminatory, the 
courts have without hesitation, held the same to be 
unconstitutional. This will be discussed in consider-
able detail later. We think the record demonstrates that 
it does not promote the p·ublic health, safety or welfare, 
to continue to congest the fraternities in the 600-foot 
area. The only two reasons Mr. Woolley could give 
why the ordinance was passed and the only two objec-
tives which he said it was intended to meet, was to solve 
the parking problem and to keep the fraternities closer 
to the University so that they could be supervised. (R. 
94) He now admits that the congestion of fraternities 
is already bad .and that further location of fraternities 
in this area would be worse. (R. 103) Every witness 
who testified on the subject admitted that the parking 
problem is better met by having the fraternity houses 
dispersed into wider areas rather than congregated into 
narrow areas. There was positive evidence that the 
existing fraternities own 281 cars and operate them 
around the campus and around their homes, or a total 
of over 17 cars per house. (R. 76) Certainly it would 
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ignore common sense to contend that the parking ·prob-
lems and congested conditions are better met by having 
more fraternity and sorority hous.es crowded into this 
one congested area. Of course, the city says they could 
move to the west and farther to the south, where they 
would be in .a "B '' zone, but as a practical matter, the 
fraternities are not doing so. Further the record af-
firmatively shows that to ·put them into the "B" areas 
of the city, where they may permissibly build, and be 
outside the 600-foot limit forces them to distances far 
removed from the University. The shaded map intro-
duced by the city shows an area shaded in red where 
fraternities may locate. This of course, is the 600-foot 
limit to the north of the University and all of the resi-
dential '' B '' area. To the east, and to the south of the 
University campus, there is no land within 600 feet 
where fraternities may locate. To the north there is 
the narrow 600-foot strip, and everything else to the 
north of the campus is residential ''A'' or residential 
'' AA' ', where fraternities are not permitted. This leaves 
only the area shaded in red to the west, and far to the 
south. If fraternities are forced into those areas, it will 
defeat the second objective of the ordinance - keeping 
the fraternities close to the University so they can be 
supervised. Therefore~ either way one looks at it, the 
objective expressed by Mr. Woolley is defeated. The 
600-foot limitation causes congestion and crowding be-
cause of the fact that there is only one residential "A" 
district close to the University of Utah, and that is the 
area to the north. The rest of the area to the north and 
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to the east, and to the south, is closed. The result is 
if they stay close to the University, they must crowd 
within the 600-foot strip and parking problems and 
congestion results. If they were to move into the .area 
to the 'vest, they would move far distant from the 
University. As a practical matter, they are congesting 
the 600-foot area, all to the detriment of Dr. Hatch. 
There would appear to be no reason, after having 
expressly provided that fraternity and sorority houses 
and dormitories could be constructed .and maintained in 
a residential "A" district, that they would then be 
restricted to locations within 600 feet of the schools. 
Is there anything whatsoever related to the health, 
morals, safety or general welfare of the community 
which requires fraternities and sororities to be that 
close to the school to which they ,afie incident? That is 
really the only thing that the ordinance would ostensibly 
accomplish. They are permitted to build anywhere in 
residential "A" district so long as they stay within 
600 feet of the property occupied by the educational in-
stitution. Schools may move about in the ''A'' district 
wherever they may elect. Wherever the University goes 
with its properties, occupied by it for educational pur-
poses, sororities and fraternities may fan out an addi-
tional 600 feet throughout the residential ''A'' district. 
Therefore, the only possible thing that the ordinance 
could, .and in fact does accomplish is to kee-p· fraterni-
ties close to the campus. This causes congestion, park-
ing, -and traffic problems. The ordinance, however, doe,s 
not even assure that result because fraternities are p,er-
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mitted to move 10 miles from the campus in commercial, 
industrial, or residential "B" districts. Therefore, un-
der the ordinance, they may move to locations which are 
far removed from the University and there is no pos-
sible construction under which fraternities and sororities 
could be compelled by this ordinance, to locate their 
houses close to the University campus. The restriction 
is only that they locate that close if they locate in resi-
dential ''A'' district. This surely could not assure the 
public safety. 
The ordinance also permits the maintenance ·.Of fra-
ternity and sorority houses anywhere within a resi-
dential ''A'' district, so long as they are that close to 
the property occupied by the institution. No one can 
be assured just which part of the ''A'' district will 
inherit the fraternities because schools can move any-
where in the district. No particular ·portion of any resi-
dential ''A'' district is by ordinance protected against 
fr.aternities because of this freedom given to schools. 
Wherever schools may go - fraternities may follow. 
This was demonstrated by the recent acquisition of Fort 
Douglas hy the University. With this acquisition, fra-
ternities could have invaded the most exclusive area in 
Federal Heights. The city blocked this by its new ordi;. 
nance setting up the double ''A'' zone. Still the remain-
der of the ''A'' districts of the city are open to fraterni-
ties if the schools expand in to the particular area. The 
net result of the ordinance is to attempt to keep frater-
nities in ''A'' districts close to the campus. This is 
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unreasonable because fraternities in '' B'' districts do 
not need to stay close to the school. 
The United States Supreme Court in Seattle Trust Co. 
YS. Roberge~ (infra.) indicates that the city has by this 
ordinance expressed the legislative opinion that it is a 
proper "A" residential use for fraternities to locate in 
''.A .. ' ' districts subject to the condition that they remain 
within 600 feet of the campus. We respectfully submit 
that there is nothing relating to the health, morals, 
safety or general welfare which is subserved by p~ermit­
ting fraternities to build homes within 600 feet from 
the campus in residential ''A'' district, and prohibiting 
the construction of a fraternity home 650 feet away 
from the campus in the same district. Nor is there 
any basis for a requirement that fraternities. stay within 
600 feet if they locate in residential ''A'' districts, but 
letting them locate miles away if they locate in resi-
dential ''B''. Why a fraternity house located 650 feet 
from the campus in residential ''A'' district, is more 
detrimental to the public health, welfare, morals and 
safety than a fraternity house located '600 feet from the 
campus, also in the "A" district, is to us without any 
explanation. 
The 600 foot restriction forces discrimination be-
tween persons who live within th.e residential ''A'' dis-
trict. It congests fraternities near residential" A'' users 
like Dr. Hatch, .and excludes them from other residen-
tial "A" areas. Both areas in residential "A" dis-
trict have by the city been found to be alike, and to he 
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entitled to be treated alike in so far as zoning is con-
cerned, for both areas are in residential" A" area. The 
600 foot line is simply .a capricious effort on the part 
of the City Commission to favor a group of citizens 
residing in Federal Heights, who do not want fraterni-
ties around them; and in order to escape from having 
fraternities located around them, they have succeeded 
in lobbying through the City Commission, an ordinance 
which forces the fraternities either to locate in "B" 
districts at points distant from the University or crowds 
all of them around the other ''A'' residential users, 
such as Dr. Hatch. There simply cannot be any reason-
able relationship between health, morals, safety and 
welfare which will permit a fraternity house to locate 
at a point 600 feet from the campus within residential 
"A" district, .and will prohibit the same fraternity from 
locating a ·point 650 feet from the campus in the same 
residential district within the same city. 
This particular discrimination oould have been 
eliminat·ed by excluding fraternities from residential 
''A'' districts entirely. This the ordinance does not do. 
It expressly permits fraternities to locate in residential 
"A'' - thus finding that such use of property is har-
monious with residential" A" uses, and then it limits the 
places in the ''A'' district where they may locate. All 
property owners in .an "A" district are entitled to the 
same treatment. The city has so admitted by putting 
them in the same district. Mr. Woolley said that he 
could see no difference in Hatch's property and other 
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areas in the '' .... \'' district for residential use. Then the 
city discriminates against Hatch and tells him he must 
have fraternity houses located in his neighborhood and 
the ordinance assures that n1ore will locate there. 
D. THE ORDINANCE IS UNREASONABLY 
DISCRIMINATORY IN THAT IT IS DlRE~CTED· 
ONLY A·GAINST THE UNIVER.SITY OF UTAH 
AND FRATERNITIES AND SORORITIES APPUR-
TENANT THERETO. 
It app·ears quite clear from the evidence, that the 
University of Utah was the objective of this particular 
ordinance. The official minutes of the Zoning and 
Planning Committee use the words: ''This means the 
University of Utah", in referring to this particular ordi-
nance. It also appears that the ordinance, subdivision 
6, vvas amended to place the 600 foot restriction because 
of a petition filed by residents of Federal Heights, 
objecting to the expansion of fraternity houses on Parry 
Avenue. The matter was referred to the Zoning and 
Planning Commission, for study. Mr. Woolley, who is 
the head of the Zoning and Planning Commission, stated 
that they studied the problem, but he admits that the 
only area studied was the area north of the University 
of Utah, and that it is the only area he knew of where 
there was a fraternity problem (R. 107). In th·e recom-
mendation made to the City Commission, the Zoning and 
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Planning Commission said in their official minutes that 
the 600-foot limitation meant the University of Utah. 
In addition to this we have the fact that they picked 
the arbitrary line of 600 feet and when Mr. Woolley was 
asked why 600 feet was picked, he said that this was 
done because 600 feet would exactly encompass all exist-
ing fraternities at the University of Utah (R. 114). The 
map introduced shows the 600 foot line at the top of the 
map cutting immediately behind the fraternity house 
which is located the fartherest to the north and which was 
established prior to 1939. Therefore, it s~eems unmis-
takably clear that the ordinance was directed toward 
the University of Utah. The 600-foot limit, the minutes, 
the study made by the Zoning Commission, the peti-
tion which activated and later impelled the passing of 
the ordinance, all so suggest. It is discriminatory, and 
class legislation, we contend, to segregate from a city, 
the fraternity and sorority houses of the University of 
Utah and pass restrictive zoning ordinances just for 
them. This is not particularly assigned as an individual 
ground for declaring the ordinance in question to be 
unconstitutional. However, 'vhen this fact is taken into 
account, the other ·points which are urged take an addi-
tional weight and meaning. The contention of Dr. Hatch, 
that the zoning ordinance forces fraternity houses into 
his "back-yard", is bolstered by the fact that the zon-
ing ordinance ·was designed to confine fraternities of 
the University of Utah all within an area close to his 
home. 
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E. THE 600-FOOT RESTRICTION IS ARBT-
TRARI~, CAPRICIOUS .AND WITHOUT ANY REAS-
ONABLE B.A818. 
It seems clear that the ordinance was designed 
solely to meet the particular situation existing at the 
University of Utah. Notwithstanding this, the Zoning 
Commission drew a line through the area to the 
north of the campus which went through houses and 
lots indiscriminately. The line cuts through Dr. Hatch's 
lot and house and cuts through the houses and lots of 
many of the other residents of the area. Since the Zon-
ing ordinance was directed toward this particular area, 
we think that it is highly irregular, arbitrary, discrim-
inatory, and unreasonable for the city to put the line 
right up through the middle of part of the peop.Je's 
property. We think we have demonstrated under 
the evidence as set forth above, that the ordinanee was 
directed toward the University of Utah,. and the pro-
tection of the Federal Heights area. There can be no 
reasonable justification for the extension of a flat 600-
foot line which was directed toward a particular area 
and yet was directed indiscriminately through houses, 
and lots. We think that any ordinance that does '30 
is unconstitutional, that it is unreasonable and discrim-
inatory to put one particular building lot half in resi-
dential ''A'' district, and half in a district where 
fraternities are permitted to live. It is unconstitu-
tional to take a ·particular house and put half of that 
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house in an area where fraternities can live and the 
other half of the house in an area where fraternities 
cannot live. And this is particularly so where the ordi-
nance in question was directed at this particular area. 
There :are several cases holding expressly that un-
der such circumstances, the ordinance is unconstitu-
tional and void. The first of these cases is Buffalo 
Park Land vs. Buffalo, 126 Miscellaneous 207, 294 
N.Y.S. 413. There, a zoning ordinance divided a 60-foot 
lot so as to place 40 feet of that :parcel in a residential 
district and the other 20 feet in an apartment hotel 
district. The ordinance was held to be unconstitutional 
and unreasonable. This was true, even though the en-
tire block of the city in which said lot was located was 
so divided by the line, the block was 2200 feet in length 
and 225 feet in width. The particular zoning ordinance 
was directed only toward that ·city block .and it was held 
unreasonab~e, arbitrary, and discriminatory to so bisect 
a building lot with a line that 40 feet w-as in a residential 
district where only homes could be built and the other 
part of the lot was in a hotel district where hotels and 
apartments could be built. 
See also the case of Fouss vs. McConnel, Ga., 157 
S. E. '625. There, by ordinance, the city of Atlanta 
zoned the first 122 feet of a group of lots into residential 
use only and the back 100 feet for business. The court 
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in holding the ordinance unconstitutional said as fol-
lows: 
'' ... If the zoning ordinance restricts the use 
of his lot to residential purposes other than the 
front 100 feet, then said ordinance, as it seeks 
to divide his lot into two separate use classes by 
zoning the first 100 feet to business and restrict-
ing the rear 120 feet to residential use is un-
reasonable, arbitrary, illegal, and unconstitu-
tional.'' 
This case is strengthened by the fact that it was 
the University of Utah area at which the city was 
"shooting". The courts lay down the uniform rule 
that in determining the constitutionality of .a statute, 
the locality and the circumstances, are to be considered 
and the matter is not to be resolved by abstractions. 
See Women's Kansas City St. Andrews Society vs. 
Kansas City, 54 Fed. 2d, 1071. Where there is only one 
group of fraternities and sororities in the city and only 
one institution to which they are appurtenant, and where 
the complaint arises over that particular area and the 
Zoning and Planning Commission in making their study 
of the city to see where the line should go, studied only 
the University area, and where in their recommenda-
tions to the City Commission, they say we mean the 
University of Utah, and where the 600-foot line is picked 
to fit this particular locality and is 'picked so as to 
exactly encompass the house fartherest removed from 
the campus, and then the city strikes a line down through 
the middle of houses and properties, such legislation is 
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highly unreasonable and arbitrary; and of course, the 
plaintiff Hatch is in a position to complain because his 
property and his house are S'plit by the 600-foot line. 
F. THERE IS NO ~CONSTIT·UTIONAL BASIS 
FOR SEGREGATING FR:OM R·EBID·ENTIAL 
USERS, PE'R.SONS WHO USE RESIDENTIAL 
PROPEilTY FOR F~ATERNITY AND SORORITY 
HOUSES. 
In approaching this problem, we must confess that 
there is not a great deal of law written specifically on 
the subject of fraternities. The only case which we 
have been able to find, dealing directly with fraternities, 
is an early Nebraska ease entitled Pettis v. Alpha Chap-
ter of Phi Beta Pi, 111 Neb. 525, 213 N. W. 835. This 
case holds tha~ fraternities are subject to separate class-
ification. The case has not subsequently been cited or 
followed. We have been unable to find another case 
directly involving fraternitie-s. Our reasoning on this 
point must, therefore, be by analogy. 
The power of a municipal corpora~tion to enact zon-
ing ordinances is nothing but the exercise of the state 
police power. Cities have the right to exercise the police 
power of the state only to the extent that power is ex-
pressly delegated by statute. In the case of cities and 
towns in Utah, the delegation of the police p·ower is 
contained in Section 15-8-89 Utah Code Annotated, 1943. 
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The delegation is in broad and sweeping language. Still 
cities may only exercise the power to zone for the pur-
pose of ''promoting health, safety, morals and the gen-
eral "~elfare of ~the community". Without the statu-
tory delegation, there would be no power in the city to 
zone at all. With the statutory delegation, cities may 
zone for the purposes set out in the statu·te. Even with-
out such a statutory limitation, principles of constitu-
tional law "\Vould and do prohibit zoning except to pro-
mote the health, morals, safety and general welfare of 
the people. Even though the statute tends to promote 
one of those objectives, it is unconstitutional if, in do-
ing so, it unreasonably discriminates against any p-ar-
ticular class. There are numerous cases to this effect 
throughout the books. We set forth 'below comments 
from some of the most recent cases. Each of the cases 
cited below is a recent case rep.resenting the present 
state of the law. 
The first case, Geneva Investment Company vs. 
City of St. Louis, 87 Fed. 2d, 83, held that zoning ordi-
nances regulating the use of realty under power con-
ferred by statute must tend to promote the public health, 
safety, or welfare without discrimination. In Acker vs. 
Baldwin, (Cal. S. Ct.) 108 P. 2d. 899, the court said that 
in considering the validity of zoning ordinances, courts 
must determine in addition to the need thereof, whether 
they are arbitrary or discriminatory in their concep-
tion and application and whether they have any reason-
able tendency to promote the public morals, health, 
safety or general welfare, and prosperity of the com-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
munity. In a recent Nebraska case, Cassel Realty Co. v. 
City of Omaha, 14 N.W. 2d. 600, the court held that a 
zoning ordinance restricting building uses, must not be 
discriminatory, unreasonable nor arbitrary, and must 
bear some relationship to the purposes sought to be ac-
complished. In Landu vs. Levin, a Missouri case, 213 
S.W. 2d. 483, the court held that all use restrictions and 
legislative enactments of a city must not only be reason-
able but also must not discriminate and they must further 
fairly tend to be of value and have substantial relation-
ship to some purpose for which the city may exercis-e its 
police power. To the same effect, see National House 
vs. Board of Adjustments, a New Jersey case, 61 At-
lantic 2d. 55; Fass v. City of Highland Park, a Michi-
gan case, 32 N.W. 2d. 375; George v. Hall, Wyoming 199 
P. 2d. 815; Thompson on Real property, Section 5615, 
Volume 10. Without laboring this point further we sub-
mit that zoning ordinances are only valid if they tend 
to promote the public welfare, health, morals or safety, 
and unless this is done without unreasonable discrim-
ination between persons or classes situated alike. 
By p·ermitting schools to exist throughout residen-
tial ''A'' districts, and then permitting fraternities and 
sororities to locate their houses in "A" districts, so 
long as they stay within 600 feet of the school, the ordi-
nance affirmatively shows that the legislative authority 
of the city, did riot consider the establishment of fra-
ternities in "A" districts to be bad in and of itself. 
This legislation by the city merely suggests that frater-
nities and sororities are bad if they locate more than 
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600 feet from the campus, but are good if they locate 
"ithin that area in ''A'' district. There w·ould be no 
reason whatever ~vhy this fraternity group could not 
reside in the very house where it now resides if the 
University of Utah would sim:ply acquire some IP'rop·erty 
within 600 feet of this particular house and main-ta.in 
thereon an observatory, a greenhouse, a labora.tory, a 
classroom, or any other plant of the University. In other 
words, the ordinance does not provide that fraternities 
and sororities may not reside in residential ''A'' dis-
trict. It provides merely that they may only reside in 
''A'' districts if they stay within 600 feet of the campus. 
The school, of course, may be established in ''A'' district, 
anywhere that any school decides that it desires to lo-
cate. Without restriction, the University of Utah could 
move throughout the residential "A'' district, and buy, 
lease or occupy land, and if it did so, fraternity houses 
could follow it anywhere in Salt Lake City. The ordi-
nance therefore, does not suggest that fraternity and 
sorority houses are bad, but only that they are bad if 
located more than 600 feet away from the school prop-
erty. That such connotation must be read into the ordi-
nance is made clear by the United States Supreme Court 
in the case of State Ex Rei Seattle Trust Company v. 
Roberge, 278 U. S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 50. In that case the 
ordinance in question was almost verbatim to the one 
under construction here, except for the 600-foot limita-
tion. It had, however, one additional provision after 
permitting fraternities, sororities, and dormitories or-
dinarily appurtenant to colleges to locate in "A'' dis-
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tricts, in that it provided that philanthropic homes for 
children or aged :people might be constructed in resi-
dential ''A'' district if the consent of two-thirds of the 
people within a certain number of feet of the proposed 
building could be obtained. The Supreme Court held that 
this language permitting homes for the aged and for 
children to be constructed in residential ''A'' affirma-
tively showed that the legislative arm of the city did not 
consider the maintenance of such homes in ''A'' districts 
to be inconsistent with the use of the districts for resi-
dential purposes. In this regard the Supreme Court said: 
''The right of the trustee to devote his land 
to any legitimate use is property within the pro-
tection of the Constitution. The facts disclosed 
by the record make it clear that the exclusion 
of the new home from the first district is not in-
dis'pensible to the general zoning plan. And there 
is no legislative determination that the proposed 
building would be inconsistent with public health, 
safety, morals or general welfare. The enact-
ment itself plainly suggests the contrary.'' 
The ordinance is set out in full in the United States 
Supreme Court opinion, it is almost verbatim to the one 
under construction here. The United States Supreme 
Court has construed it as an affirmative indication by 
the city that the maintenance of such homes in residen-
tial ''A'' districts are not inconsistent with the gen-
eral zoning plan, nor inconsistent with, nor harmful 
to the public health, safety, morals or general welfare. 
There is no escap~e from the conclusion that the city has · 
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by its legislative enactment determined that the mant-
tenance of fraternity and sorority houses and dormitor-
ies in an ''.A'' district is not inconsistent with the main-
tenance of residences, nor detrimental to the public 
health, 'Yelfare, morals or safety. Otherwise they 'vould 
not be permitted in such districts. 
It is extremely difficult for us to see any reason-
able or constitutional basis which makes a fraternity in 
a residential "A" district a menace to the public health, 
safety, morals, and general welfare, if it gets beyond 
600 feet and yet makes it harmonious with, and helpful 
to the public health, safety, morals and general welfare 
to establish fraternity houses in residential ''A'' dis-
trict if they stay within 600 feet of the University cam-
pus. The ordinance cannot be justified as an attempt· 
to preserve a particular area exclusively for home prop-
erties because the ordinance expressly p·ermits in addi-
tion to homes, the maintenance of the following uses: 
(1) Schools, (2) Churches, (3) Libraries and Museums, 
(4) Public parks, public recreation grounds and play-
grounds, ( 5) Farming and truck gardening, nurseries, 
greenhouses, railroad or street railway p·as·senger sta-
tion, and rights of way, including railroad y:ards or 
sheds, (6) all public buildings except penal or mental 
institutions, and (7) telephone exchanges. All of these, 
and all appurtenant uses to these may be maintained in 
residential ''A'' district, and may locate .anywhere with-
in an ''A'' district. The .appurtenant uses, as further 
defined, include the carrying on of the profession of 
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a physician, musician, or other ·professional person, 
the maintenance of rooming and boarding houses, dormi-
tories, fraternity and sorority houses, if they stay within 
600 feet of the campus. Since the campus may be ex-
tended anywhere throughout the residential ''A'' dis-
trict, there is no assurance that any particular area in 
the ''A'' district, will in practical operation not be 
invaded by fraternity and sorority houses. If the Uni-
versity were to acquire or occupy property within 600 
feet of the home now occupied by the plaintiff fraternity 
houses, it would be harmonious, according to the ordi-
nance, with the public health, morals, and welfare, for 
this fraternity house to be continued exactly as it is, 
and it would not be injurious to the health, morals or 
safety of the people who live adjacent to it. Why fra-
ternities are bad in so far as the public health, morals, 
safety and general welfare are concerned if they locate 
in an ''A'' district beyond 600 feet from the campus 
and good if they stay within that distance, escapes us. 
The Illinois case cited above, which holds that it 
IS unconstitutional tQ permit schools to locate in resi-
dential ''A'' districts, and then prohibit dormitories 
from locating in the same district, seems to us to be 
directly in p.oin t in this regard. 
There are many other cases which we think have 
an important bearing on this point. The cases uniformly 
hold that it is improper, unconstitutional, and unreason-
able to attempt to exclude churches from a residential 
''A'' district. There is nothing promoting the health, 
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morals, public safety, or general welfare which creates 
a residential ''A'' district, and excludes therefrom 
churches. All of the cases are to this effect. See Synod 
of Ohio, United Lutheran v. Joseph, 139 Ohio State 229, 
39 N.E. 2d. 515; City of Sherman vs. Simms, 143 Texas 
115, 183 S.W. 2d. 415; Ellsworth vs. Gercke, Ariz. case, 
15'6 P. 2d. 242; Overbrook Farms Club vs. Town Zoning 
Board, 351 Pa. 77, 40 At. 2d. 423; Thompson on Real 
Property, Section 5626; State Ex Rel Roman Bishop 
of Reno vs. Hill, a Nevada case, 90 P. 2d. 217. All of 
these cases are recent cases, several of. them d-ecided by 
western jurisdictions and all of them uniformly hold 
that it is unconstitutional to attempt to exclude from a 
residential ''A'' district, the establishment of churches. 
All of them are based upon the considevation that to 
exclude churches has no constitutional relationship he-
tween the public health, morals, safety and general wel-
fare, and that an ordinance which excludes churches 
from a residential "A" district is void. 
The next line of cases which we think indicate th:at 
a like result ought to obtain in the case of fraternities 
is the case of Village of University Heights vs. Clevel~and 
Jewish Orphans Home. Circuit Court of appeals, 6th 
circuit, 20 F. 2d. 745, wherein the court says: 
''The structural plans of the proposed orphan-
age comply with all requirements of the village. 
There is no objection to the buildings per se, but 
only to the use of them as a home for a large 
number of children. If they were intended for a 
private school, or for private residences, their 
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use as such would and could not be prohibited. 
The question is whether the 'proposed use is so 
different in character from concededly legitimate 
uses, as to bring it within the scope of the police 
power of the municipality. That.·power has been 
held, as we have seen, to include the right gen-
erally to exclude business houses, stores, shops, 
and apartment houses from strictly residential 
areas. It has never been held the right to prohibit 
the use for orphan children of cottages built ac-
cording to the requirements of the municipality. 
We can see many valid reasons, affecting the 
public welfare, that would justify the exclusion 
of factories, business houses, shops and even 
apartment houses from the strictly residential 
districts, but such would not apply to the use of 
structurally 'proper cottages for an orphanage; 
while an orphanage would no doubt be disagree-
able to the community in some respects than a 
private school or private residences, we are un-
willing to hold that it is within the power of 
the village to prohibit the use of cottages of this 
character for that purpose.'' 
In Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society vs. 
Kansas City, Mo., a Circuit Court of Appeals case, 
eight circuit, 58 F. 2d. 597, the court said: 
"The chief objection to plaintiff's coming in 
to the neighborhood seems to have come from the 
residents· of the Rockhill district, and from the 
trustees of the various trusts connected with the 
William Rockhill Nelson Art Gallery. * * * The 
owner of the adjoining duplexes testified that 
having an old ladies' home as an immediate 
neighbor would diminish the value of his prop-
erty, and it would affect his morals to have it 
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referred • to as the old ladies' home next door ' 
* * • Zoning laws rest upon the '·police p·ower of 
the states, and ""'hen they are fairly within the 
well-recognized bounds of such power they are 
valid, even though they may entail some hard-
ship upon property owners. While such police 
power is broad, there are limitations to its exer-
cise, which the courts have not attempted to ac-
curately, define. However, restrictions by zon-
ing ordinances imposed upon the use of one's 
property to be valid must bear some substantial 
relationship to the public health, safety, morals 
or general welfare.' The reserved police power 
of the state must stop when it encroaches on the 
protection accorded the citizen by the Federal 
Constitution. * * * Certainly the fact that aged 
people may have a depressing effect on some 
people is not sufficient to exclude such people 
from a district. There is no limit to the causes 
that may depress people, but they do not furnish 
a basis for the support of a restriction as to 
use of one's property. What was said by the 
Texas court in Spann vs. City of Dallas et al., 
111 Tex. 350, 235 S.W. 513, 516, 19 A.L.R. 1387, 
with respect to the noise and annoyance incident 
to the operation of a grocery store in a residen-
tial district, would apply a fortiori to the so-
called 'depressing influence' of elderly residents, 
viz.: 'It could disturb or impair the comfort of 
only highly sensitive persons. But laws are not 
made to suit the acute sensibiliti~s of such per-
sons. It is with common humanity - the average 
of the people, that police laws must deal. A law-
ful and ordinary use of prop.erty is not to be p-ro-
hibited because repugnant to the sentiments of 
a p~articular class.' * * * There must be limits as 
to what even a general plan may do, and the 
mere comprehensiveness of the zoning ordinance 
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is in itself no justification for each separate re-
striction that the ordinance imposes. * * * If the 
restriction here complained of does in fact, how-
ever, have no relationship to the fundamentals 
upon which zoning statutes can be sustained, viz. 
public health, safety, moral, and general wel-
fare, and is not essential to a general zoning 
ordinance based on these considerations, then 
the courts should not hesitate to protect plaintiff 
from being deprived of the use of its prop.erty 
under the guise of police power. * * * Our con-
clusion is that the restriction upon the use of 
plain tiff's property is not an essential of the 
general zoning plan, and is in its application to 
plaintiff's property so arbitrary and unreason-
able as to be void.'' 
Western Theological Seminary vs. Evanston, supra, 
as the title implies, concerned a theological seminary. 
Part of the opinion in that case reads as follows (325 Ill. 
511, 156 N.E. 783.) : 
''Both liber:ty and property are subject to 
the police power of the state, under which new 
burdens may be imposed on property and new 
restrictions placed on its use when the public 
welfare demands it. The police power is, how-
ever, limited to enactments having reference to 
the public health, comfort, safety, or welfare. 
An act which deprives a citizen of his liberty or 
prop.erty rights cannot be sustained under the 
'police power unless a due regard for the public 
health, comfort, safety, or welfare requires it. 
Ruhstrat vs. People, supra, (185 Ill. 133, 57 N.E. 
41, 49 L.R.A. 181, 76 Am. St. Rep. 30) ; Bailey 
v. People, 190 Ill. 28, 60 N.E. 98, 54 L.R.A. 838, 
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83 Am. St. Rep. 116; Bessette v. People, 193 Ill. 
334, 62 N .E. :215, 56 L.R.A. 558; People vs. City 
of Chicag-o, 261 Ill. 16, 103 N.E. 609, 49 L.R.A., 
N.S., 438, Ann. Cas. 1915 A, 292; Catholic Bishop 
vs. Villag·e of Palos Park, 286 Ill. 400, 121 N.E. 
561. The legislative determination as to what is 
a proper exercise of the police p.ower is not con-
clusive. Whether the means employed have any 
real, substantial relation to the public health, com-
fort, safety, or welfare, or are arbitrary and 
unreasonable, is a question which is subject to 
review by the courts, and in determining that 
question the courts will disregard mere forms 
and interfere for the protection of rights injur-
iously affected by arbitrary and unreasonable ac-
tion. City of Aurora vs. Burns, supra (319 Ill. 
84, 149 N.E. 784)." 
The court proceeded to hold unconstitutional an ordi-
nance which permitted schools in an "A" district but 
excluded dormitories. 
A home for aged poor was the subject matter of 
State of Washington ex rei. Seattle Title Trust Co. vs. 
Roberge, supra. In the opinion of the court in that case, 
we find the following (278 U.S. 116, 49 S. Ct. 51): 
''Zoning measures must find their justifica-
tion in the police power exerted in the interest of 
the public. Euclid vs. Ambler Realty Co., sup.ra, 
(272 U.S. 365), 387 (47 S. Ct. (114) 118 (71 L. 
Ed·. (303), 310, 54 A.L.R. 1016) ). 'The govern-
mental power to interfere by zoning regulations 
with the general rights of the landowner by re-
stricting the character of his use, is not unlimited 
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and, other questions aside, such restriction can-
not be imposed if it does not bear a substantial 
relation to the public health, safety, morals, or 
general welfare.' Nectow v. Cambridge, supra 
(277 U.S. 183), page 188 ( 48 S. Ct. ( 477), 448, 
(72 L. Ed. 842, 844) ). Legislatures, may not, un-
der the guise of the police power, impose restric-
tions that are unnecessary ~and unreasonable upon 
the use of private property or the pursuit of 
useful activities. * * * It is not suggested that 
the proposed new home for aged poor would 
be a nuisance. We find nothing in the record 
reasonably tending to show that its construction 
or maintenance is liable to work any injury, in-
convenience or annoyance to the community, the 
district or any person .. The facts shown clearly 
distinguish the proposed building and use from 
·such billboards or other uses which by reason of 
their nature are liable to be offensive.'' 
In the City of Miami Beach v. State, supra, the 
Supreme Court of Florida was called upon to con-
sider the validity of an ordinance ·prohibiting private 
schools in a multiple £amily district while permitting 
public schools. The ordinance was held invalid because 
·''it ap.pears to be arbitrary and unreasonable and has 
no relation to the public safety, health, morals, com-
fort, or general welfare.'' 
The burden is placed by the courts upon the city 
to point out the reasonableness of the basis for any 
discrimination made by an ordinance, see 22 C.J. 141; 
Deaver v. Napier, '139 Minn. 219, 166 N.W. 187; Christ 
v. Fent, 16 Okla. 375,.84 P. 1074; State v. Joseph (Ohio) 
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39 N.E. 2d. 515; Applestein v. Mayor-of-Baltimore, 156 
Md. 40, 47, 143 Atl. 666. 
We submit that the ordinance in question is invalid 
both as to this plaintiff fraternity and as to Dr. Hatch. 
This court should so declare. 
CONCLUSION 
In view of the foregoing discussion and authorities 
cited in support thereof, we earnestly urge this. honor-
able court to declare Section '6715, Chapter 65 to be un-
constitutional, unreasonable and discriminatory and to 
reverse the judgment of the trial court accordingly. 
Respectfully submitted. 
CLYDE, MECHAM & WHITE 
Attorneys for .Ap·pellant 
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